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Karesh: Wills

WILLS
COLE.MAN KARS1*

The subject of Wills, as heretofore, comprehends the topics of Descent and Distribution, Wills, and Administration of Estates. To a
degree these areas overlap with Property, and some cases which
involve interpretation of wills are to be found in the survey of
Property.
Descent and Distribution-Inheritance

by Slayer

A case of more than usual interest, in terms both of the law and of
the facts involved, is Legette v. Smith. 1 This case has already been
made the subject of a case note in the South CarolinaLaw Quarterly,2 but some additional comment is necessary, particularly since
this writer does not entirely agree with the conclusions of the writer
of the note. The facts briefly were that a husband, intending to
kill the rival for his wife's affections, killed the wife instead. He
was acquitted, and the sole question was whether these facts would
bar the husband from taking as an heir of the wife. Since the slayer
was acquitted, the provisions of Section 19-5 of the 1952 Code did
not apply, that section making a conviction determinative of forfeiture.
The trial judge set aside the verdict of the jury in favor of the
husband, and decreed that the husband should be debarred from
participating in his wife's estate, on the ground that the wife had
been killed in the husband's commission of an unlawful act. The
Supreme Court agreed that the evidence showed conclusively that
the husband was engaged in committing an unlawful act which would
have warranted his conviction of murder or voluntary manslaughter
on the criminal side of the court, but disagreed with the conclusion
that that fact alone required forfeiture. On the basis of the earlier
decisions of Sinith v. Todd3 and Keels v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry.
Co.,4 the court reiterated that the principle which in a given case
prevented the slayer from taking was the maxim that no man shall
profit by his own wrong, and that it extended to depriving the
wrongdoer from taking under the Statute of Descent and DistribuOProfessor of Law, University of South Carolina.

1. 85 S.E. 2d 576 (S.C. 1955).

2. 7 S.C.L.Q. 475 (Spring 1955).
3. 155 S.C. 323, 152 S.E. 506, 70 A.L.R. 1529 (1930).
4. 159 S.C. 520, 157 S.E. 834 (1931).
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tion. In thus declaring that the common law maxim was engrafted
upon, or operated despite, the statute, the court follows minority doctrine. But the court refused to apply the rule under the facts here,
saying:
But we know of no decision in the courts of America or England denying to one who in the course of an unlawful assault
upon one person kills another to whom he bears no malice and
to whom his criminal intent is not directed, the right to inherit
from the person so killed. Nor do the principles of the common law or considerations of justice, morality or public policy so
require.
The fact that there are no English or American cases that deny a
killer the right to take under the circumstances mentioned does not
mean that there are English or American cases that give him the
right :4a the point is simply a novel one, on which the court takes
an original stand. And why, it may be asked, do not considerations
of justice, morality, or public policy require that the slayer be
barred of the right? Here one may well differ from the court in
its conception of what is sound public policy. It seems to the writer
that the policy against such a view as the court adopts is already
implicit in Section 19-5, which, while it may not be utilized where
there is acquittal, provides "no person who shall be convicted in any
court of competent jurisdiction of unilawfully (italics supplied) killing another person shall receive any benefit from the death of the
person unlawfully (italics supplied) killed, except in cases of involuntary manslaughter, whether by way of intestate succession, will,
vested or contingent remainder or otherwise .

. ..
"

If the purpose of

the statute is, as the court has indicated in Snith v. Todd,5 "not to
abrogate or delimit the common-law rule . . . but to add to and ex-

tend that rule in an important particular not covered by the common
4a. While there is sympathetic dicta in some of the cases that such a killing
should not deprive the slayer of the right to take, only one case - which is
cited by the Court: In re Wolf, 88 Misc. 433, 150 N.Y.S. 738 (1914), a Surrogate Court case - deals factually with the same kind of situation. In it,
as in this case, the slayer, intending to kill his wife's paramour, killed the wife
instead. Averting to this fact, but relying principally on the ground that
the motive was not to "influence the succession" -that is, to profit by the
death - the court found for the husband. The Wolf case has been disapproved
in later New York cases insofar as the principal ground is concerned. The rule
is fairly universal that forfeiture does not depend upon an intention to acquire benefit by the killing. Van Alstyne v. Tuffy, 103 Misc., 169 N.Y.S. 173
(1918) ; In re Sparks' Estate, 172 Misc. 642, 15 N.Y.S. 2d 926 (1939) ; In re
Sergillio's Estate, 206 Misc. 75, 134 N.Y.S. 2d 800 (1954). That this is so
is indicated by Smith v. Todd, in the text, where the slayer immediately after
the slaying committed suicide.
5. Note 3 supra at 337.
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law," (making the conviction in and of itself determinative of forfeiture) the statute itself is a recognition of unlawful killing, without regard to the intent as to the person who is the victim of the
wrongful act, as the basis for withholding benefits from the wrongdoer. The facts being the same whether trial is in a civil or a
criminal case, it is paradoxical, to say the least, that if the slayer
had been convicted in this case he should not be allowed to take,
but having been acquitted he should be so allowed. In its exception
of involuntary manslaughter from the terms of the statute, the legislature evidently drew the line between death as the result of a wilful
act or of an intent to kill and death as a result of negligence. Perhaps
that should be the true distinction: not whether in intending to kill
one person the assailant killed another, but whether the killing was
the result of an intent to kill as distinguished from negligent killing.6
Every rule, or nearly every rule, has or should have its exceptions.
The rule that no man should profit by his own wrong, as applied in
the simplest cases of this kind, brands the killing as the wrong, the
acquisition on death as the profit - the profit is the very fruit of
the wrong. In the facts of this case, the wrong having produced
the benefit, should that benefit fall outside the rule? The solution
does not lie in a preliminary statement of the court that "The commission of a crime does not in itself work a forfeiture of the criminal's right to inherit. A may murder B, a stranger, without impairment of A's right to inherit from A's father." In this hypothesis
A has done a wrong, but the wrong has brought him no benefit. The
rule is completely foreign to such facts. The court then puts a pair
of supposititious questions as analogies. The first is:
Let us suppose that in the present case Edna Smith's son,
Henry, had become involved in a quarrel with a stranger outside the store, and had fired his pistol at the stranger under
such circumstances that, had the stranger been killed, Henry
would have been guilty of voluntary manslaughter, but that the
bullet had missed its mark and had gone through a window and
killed Henry's mother. Should he, in such a case, regardless
of the fact that he had not the slightest intention of killing his
mother, be held to have forfeited his rights as her heir?
The answer to that question in part is that if son Henry had been
convicted of manslaughter or murder, he would, under the statute,
lose his rights as an heir. If the exception has to be made for Henry
6. TE RESTATI MINT, REsTrrUTION § 187 limits forfeiture to murder and
excludes manslaughter. The cases on the whole justify this conclusion. The
South Carolina statute embraces all homicides except involuntary manslaughter.
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if he were acquitted or never tried, does the exception have to, apply
to a case of the sort under discussion? Let us suppose that son A
intends to poison his father B, and by mistake his mother C drinks
the poison and dies. Should A take as C's heir or legatee or insur-ance beneficiary? A revulsion to A's taking would be naturala revulsion not merely personal but legal as well. Or suppose A,
an otherwise well-disposed person, should in a state of exhilarated
drunkenness fire a pistol indiscriminately and in so doing kill his
-mother B. Whether he was convicted of murder or not, ought he
to be allowed nevertheless to take as his mother's heir or under her
will or as an insurance beneficiary because civilly there was no
malice towards her and no intent to harm her?
The second question which the Court puts is:
Or should a wife, who, while driving with her husband in the
family car, was negligent or reckless in its operation and thereby caused a wreck and her husband's death be debarred from
inheriting from him or receiving the proceeds of a policy of insurance on his life, despite the total absence of any intent to
harm him?
The court's response is "we think not". But another answer is
,that under the statute, if she were convicted of reckless homicide
she would be barred. (It may be legislative oversight that when
the offense of reckless homicide was made a part of the law in 19377
it was not included as an exception along with involuntary manslaughter under Section 19-5, which had been enacted in 1924.8 The
possibility is as great, however, that the omission was deliberate
in view of the difference in the degree of negligence involved in the
two types of homicide.) Aside from that feature, is the analogy
a proper one? The difference between a killing which is the result
of an intent to kill, although it is an intent to kill another than the
person actually killed, and a killing through negligence is obvious;
and, except for a possible legislative inadvertence, death caused by
the latter means may fall within a not so severe condemnation, just
as with involuntary manslaughter. If A kills B through negligence,
that is an accident; if A, intending to kill B, kills C, that too is an
accident. But the two accidents should not be treated alike, and
one would not seriously speak of A as negligent in the second case,
however much he did not intend to bring about the unforeseen result.
7. 40 STAT. 522.
8. 33 STAT. 1188.
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Bastardy Statutes
In Peoples National Bank v. Manos Bros., Inc.,9 a case largely
devoted to questions of divorce and legitimacy, the provisions of the
Bastardy Statutes, 10 (making gifts to bastard children or a mistress
voidable as to the excess over one-fourth of the donor's estate as
against lawful wife and children) were successfully invoked by a
child of a testator who had excluded the child from his will. The
testator had been married to a woman living in Greece (where she
remained). She had a child which the testator refused to acknowledge as his child. (The issue as to whether the child was the testator's was resolved in this case in the child's favor.) The testator
obtained a divorce in Georgia, and thereafter he remarried. He gave
a life estate in extensive properties to his second wife. In this proceeding the principal issue was the validity of the Georgia divorce.
It was held under the facts to be invalid. On that account the earlier
marriage still subsisted, and the wife was held entitled to dower. This
result would have followed, of course, without regard to the Bastardy Statutes. The child of the earlier marriage was held entitled
to avoid the gift to the second wife as to the excess over one-fourth.
The net result was that the avoided excess passed as intestate property
to the child, subject to his mother's right of dower."
The only item worthy of comment is that in this case the penalty
fell upon an innocent person-the second wife who, according to
the findings, married the testator in good faith and believing him
free to marry. The Bastardy Statutes are directed against gifts to
"the woman with whom he lives in adultery" -an
unkind, if technically correct, description of the person involved here. In the light
of the otherwise unhampered right of a testator to make dispositions
of his property as foolishly, arbitrarily and unjustly as he wishes, it
seems regrettable that the people of the State should continue to be
saddled with this statutory anachronism- which the court, as here,
is bound to follow.
Wills -

Lapse and Residue

The question of lapse and its relation to a residuary clause was
posed in Nash v. Gardner,12 in which the facts were substantially
9. 226 S.C. 257, 84 S.E. 2d 857 (1954).
10. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 19-238 and 57-10.

11. Having accepted dower, she could not also take as an heir.

CODE OF

LAWS or SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 19-151, 19-57; Buist v. Dawes, 3 Richard-

son's Equity 281 (S.C. 1851).
12. 226 S.C. 165, 84 S.E. 2d 375 (1954).
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these: Testator by item 6 of his will gave his son A his homeplace.
In a subsequent clause (the 14th) he provided "if there is any money
or property real or personal remaining or belonging to my estate I
give and bequeath to my four youngest sons, namely" A, B, C and
D. The last clause (the 15th) provided that "if any of my children
mentioned in this will shall die without having any lawful heirs their
part of my estate shall revert back and belong to my heirs then living". The son A died unmarried and childless before the testator.
The plaintiff had bought up the interests of all the heirs except the
defendant, who was one of nine surviving children of the testator.
There were three possibilities: (1) that the plaintiff had complete
ownership; (2) that the defendant had a one-ninth interest; (3) that
the defendant owned a one-ninth of a one-fourth interest -this
last possibility being brought into play only on appeal.
The lower court determined that the 15th clause charted the course
of the otherwise lapsed gift to A, and that A having died without
lawful heirs-construed as children- his devise passed to the
testator's heirs (his surviving nine children), and accordingly that
the defendant took a one-ninth share. The Supreme Court did not
accept this view. It held, in the first place, that the gift lapsed by
reason of A's death and passed into the 14th clause, which it construed to be a general, rather than a restricted, one. Although the
court cited no authorities on the scope of residuary clauses, it clearly had in mind the principle that the extent to which such a clause
may be general or limited depends on the testator's intention, and
that general residuary clauses - designed to prevent intestaciesembrace not only property not specifically disposed of but property
that turns out to have been ineffectually disposed of or to have
lapsed. And the court apparently assumed, without discussion, that
this was true although the specific devisee was one of the residuary
i
devisees.1
13. The cases are in conflict as to whether a gift to one who is a specific
devisee and also a residuary devisce, and who dies before the testator, passes
as intestate property or passes into the residuary clause. See PAGr ON WILLS
(3d ed.) § 1431; 69 CJ. 1075; 57 Am. Jur. 978; 44 L.R.A. (n.s.) 814. A reason
given for denying its falling into the residue is that "to hold in such case that
the testator intended the lapsed legacy to fall into the residuum was said in
Craighead v. Givens, 10 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 351, to hold that the testator intended to bequeath to one who died a portion of the residue happening in consequence of his death- a consequence which could never be supposed." Dickenson v. Belden, 268 Ill. 105, 108 N.E. 1011 (1915).
The point seems never to have been raised in South Carolina, although there
are many cases in which a general or specific beneficiary was also a residuary
donee, and on his death the subject matter of the gift was disposed of under
the residuary clause. The typical case, which is easily differentiated from the
case under discussion, is that of a gift to A for life with contingent remainder,
and residuary disposition in favor of A, and the contingency not occurring on
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Having thus ordained the falling of the devise into the residuary
clause, the court concluded that the one-fourth residuary interest of
A embraced in the lapsed devise passed as intestate property, the
other three-fourths passing to B, C and D. The contention that the
residuary disposition was a class gift was denied, the court treating
14
the gift as one to individuals.
In reaching these conclusions, the Supreme Court held the lower
court in error in treating the 15th clause as a substitutional gift. The
language was construed, in the light of the rule that a will speaks
as of the time of death, as having reference to the death of a beneficiary -afterhis interest had vested. Since the devisee A had died
before the testator, it was held not to be an alternative or substitutional gift which would avert a lapse. 15
A's death: the reversion is in A as residuary taker. Here there is no lapseit is a case of an undisposed of reversion. Williams v. Kibler, 10 S.C. 414
(1877) ; Wingate v. Parnell, 214 S.C. 540, 53 S.E. 2d 653 (1949). See also,
McDonald v. Fagan, 118 S.C. 510, 111 S.E. 793 (1921) where testator gave
estate to wife for life and directed his executors on her death to sell and pay
specific amounts out of proceeds to named legatees, but made no disposition
of surplus after payment to the legatees. The surplus was held to fall into
the residue of which the wife was the beneficiary. Or there may be a direction in the terms of the specific gift that upon the death of the beneficiary the
subject matter shall fall into the residue, in which the same beneficiary is to
share. Lopez v. Lopez, 23 S.C. 258 (1885). For an example of a restricted residue into which on the death of a legatee who was also a residuary beneficiary
the lapsed share did not fall, see Torre v. Chesnut, 159 S.C. 282, 156 S.E. 906
(1931).
14. Since the gift in the 14th clause was to A, B, C, and D, and not to A,
B, C, and D "in equal shares," or "to be equally divided," or as tenants in
common, or specifying any division between them, it may well be argued that,
although a class gift was not created, a joint tenancy was created. Joint tenancies have not been abolished, the statute affecting them eliminating only the
incident of survivorship. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 19-55.
The cases held that the statute applies only to vested interests, and that in a
gift to joint tenants, if one dies before the testator, the survivors takes. Herbemont v. Thomas, Cheves Equity 21 (S.C. 1839); Ball v. Deas, 2 Strobhart
Equity 24 (S.C. 1848). If this construction were adopted, the lapsed share of
A would pass to B, C, and D, assuming, of course, that the residue was a general one.
15. The victory gained by the plaintiff on the construction of this clause was
an immediate but not necessarily a lasting or certain one. Instead of acquiring indefeasible interests, the children of the testator, including B, C and D
who took the lapsed share under the 14th clause, took interests which might
be divested by their dying without having lawful heirs. The meaning of "without having any lawful heirs" -whether embracing only children or descendants or on the other hand heirs generally, and whether referring to the birth
of heirs or to the birth and survival of heirs -may yet have to be determined. Similarly the meaning of "the heirs then living" will have to be
learned in terms of the time to which the words refer. Not to be overlooked,
although remote, is the possibility that there may be a gift by implication to
the children of B, C and D on their respective deaths. Of course the plaintiff
acquired only what his sellers could give him. These doubts, however shadowy,
attach as well to all the other gifts under the will affected by the 15th clause.
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Wills - Declaratory Judgment
The scope of an action for declaratory judgment in connection
with the construction of a will was dealt with in Foster v. Foster.16
The plaintiffs brought the action for declaratory judgment with
respect to rights and estates created by a will under which they
claimed. A demurrer was interposed on the ground that the facts
stated were not sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The lower
court overruled the demurrer, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The
court held that the action was authorized under the pertinent section of the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act.1 7 The existence of
a controversy, actual or potential, is enough:
The test of sufficiency of such a complaint is not whether it
shows that the plaintiff is entitled to a declaration of rights in
accordance with his theory, but whether he is entitled to a declaration of rights at all. Even though the plaintiff is on the wrong
side of the controversy, if he states the existence of a controversy which should be settled by the court under the Declaratory
judgment Law, he has stated a cause of action.
Contracts to Make Wills
Litigation of this type is frequently before the Supreme Court,
and the period under survey is no exception. The usual case involves
action by the disappointed promisee after the promisor has died. In
Harmon v. Aughtry, i8 the action was unusual in that it was brought
by the promisee during the promisor's lifetime. The complaint alleged that in consideration of a loan made by plaintiff to defendant,
the latter agreed to execute a will bequeathing to plaintiff's wife
$6,000, and if the wife predeceased the defendant the money was to
go to plaintiff. The wife had died. The allegation further was that
in breach of contract the defendant had failed to make the will as
agreed. The plaintiff being put to an election of remedies proceeded
upon a cause of action for damages. A demurrer on the ground that
the complaint failed to state a cause of action was sustained, the
court concluding that the action was prematurely brought. Leave
was given to amend the complaint, and an amended complaint was
served, containing similar factual allegations but asking for rescis16. 226 S.C. 130, 83 S.E. 2d 752 (1954).
17. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-2003: "... any person
interested under a deed, will . . . may have determined any question of construction or validity under the instrument . . . and obtain a declaration of
rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder."
18. 85 S.E. 2d 284 (S.C. 1955). This case is noted in 7 S.C.L.Q. 656 (Sum-

mer 1955).
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sion and restitution. A second demurrer was also sustained, on the
ground that suit had been brought before the time for performance.
The action of the court below was affirmed on appeal.
The substance of the opinion of the Supreme Court was that the
defendant could perform at any time during her life, and that there
being no breach or repudiation the plaintiff was not entitled to rescission and restitution. "A will in accordance with the contractual obligation may be made at any time during the life of the promisor." Nor
is there any implication that where no time is agreed upon within
which the will is to be executed the law will imply a reasonable time.
(In this case six years had elapsed.) But the court recognized the
possibility of relief during the promisor's lifetime:
...if in his lifetime the promisor repudiates the agreement, or
puts it out of his power to perform, as by a conveyance of the
property involved to a third person, such conduct may be treated
as an anticipatory breach and an action for immediate relief may
be immediately maintained by the promisee against the promisor.

19

The court suggested that if the promisor had agreed to execute
a will forthwith or at or within a specific time, the result would be
different. If that had been the case, further interesting questions
would arise. A will being a revocable instrument, would the failure
to execute it at or within the time create liability for nominal damages
only? Would the time factor be so vital that failure to execute it at
the time would be so material a breach as to justify rescission?
State's Claim Against Estate of Mentally Ill Patient or Trainee
The scope and effect of the Mental Health Act 2° on the liability to
the State of estates of mentally ill patients and trainees is dealt with
in South Carolina Mental Health Commission v. May.2 1 The defendant's intestate had been admitted to the South Carolina State
19. As pointed out in the case note mentioned in note 18, supra, while an
action for damages for anticipatory breach would lie on repudiation, the doctrine is inoperative in unilateral contracts not conditioned on future performance by the promisee and in contracts originally bilateral that have become
unilateral by performance on one side. The contract here was unilateral because of the completed loan of money. RESTATEMMT, CONTRACTS § 318. As
to rescission and restitution, however, there seems to be no such limitation on
renunciation of a unilateral contract, except perhaps where the repudiated duty
is to pay a liquidated debt. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 350. From the point
of view of the exception, the promise to bequeath money loaned is hardly anything more than a promise to pay a debt in a certain way, and even restitution
might not in such a case be available.
20. 48 STAT. 2042, §§ 32-892 c seq., CODE or LAWS OV SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952
(Cum. Supp. 1954).
21. 226 S.C. 108, 83 S.E. 2d 713 (1954).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

9

1955]

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 26
SURVZY O

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW

Hospital in 1911 and remained as a patient there until his death in
July 1952. The defendant, administrator, refused to pay a claim
filed by the Mental Health Commission for care and treatment for
the whole period, contending that the Mental Health Act cut off all
claims in favor of the State prior to its passage, in that the Act
superseded the statutes creating such liability. The lower court decreed that liabilities created by the former acts were not eliminated
by the passage of the Mental Health Act, but that recovery was restricted by the statute of limitations to services rendered during the
preceding six years.
The Supreme Court affirmed the holding of the lower court as to
the continued existence of claims arising prior to the Mental Health
Act, but reversed as to the statute of limitations, holding that the sixyear statute of limitations 22 did not apply. The lower court's action
was based on the language of the Statute which provides: "The commission shall present a claim for the amount due and the claim shall be
allowed and paid as other lawful claims against the estate," 23 the
view being adopted that these words should be literally construed
and should be taken as barring claims more than six years old just
as with other claims barred by the passage of that time. The Supreme Court's' attitude was that such directions related to procedural
matters such as the distribution of assets, and were not intended to
be affected by the statute of limitations. The conclusion that the
six-year statute was not operative was based on the language of the
statutes relating to filing of claims for services rendered the patient
4
and on general considerations involving limitations against the State.a
22. COD OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-143.
23. Now Section 39-950.23, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

1952 (Supp.

1954).
24. The matter of limitations is taken care of to some extent by an amendment in 1954 to Section 10-150 of the Code, the amendment being embraced in the
1954 partial re-draft of the Mental Health Act (Act No. 680, 48 Stat. 1732,
1741): "Provided, however, that limitations against claims for charges for
care, training, maintenance or treatment heretofore or hereafter received by

any patient or trainee from the South Carolina State Hospital, any State
Training School, or any State Mental Health Facility, shall commence to run
against the State, its boards, commissions or agencies charged with the operation of the above institutions only from the last date upon which the care, training, maintenance or treatment was furnished to any such patient or trainee."
Section 10-150, above referred to, is part of the Article on limitations of actions other than for recovery of real property, and provides that "The limitations presented by this article shall apply to actions brought in the name of
the State or for its benefit in the same manner as to actions by private parties."
By both the 1952 Act (47 STAT. 2063) and the 1954 Act [46 STAT. 1741;
§ 39-950.25, CODE or LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 (Supp. 1954)] a lien
is created upon the real and personal property of a person receiving care
and treatment in a State mental health facility. The enforceability of the lien
is limited to one year after the patient or trainee's death.
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Assigning the same reasons as in the case just discussed, the Supreme Court in like manner disposed of another case under similar
25
facts which reached it about the same time.
Action for Accounting -

Venue

In Irby v. Kidder 6 the question of the proper county in which to
maintain an action for accounting against the representative of the
deceased executrix of a testate estate was presented under a rather
complex set of facts. A testatrix whose will was probated in Charleston County named her two daughters executrices. They were also
beneficiaries of income in equal shares, and as executrices they were
directed to invest and pay income to themselves in equal shares, and
upon the death of one without children the whole income was to be
paid to the survivor, and upon the death of both, if only one had
children, the children should take the entire estate. The assets were
liquidated and thereafter each executrix took one-half of the estate to invest. One of them died thereafter, survived by an adopted daughter and her husband, the named defendant. Her will was
admitted to probate in Bcaufort County with her husband qualifying
as executor. The present action was brought in Richland County
by the children of the surviving executrix, who was a resident of that
county, the plaintiff's alleging that they were sole remainderman under
the will of the first testatrix and that the named defendant was commingling funds of his wife's estate with those of the estate under
which they claimed. Added as co-defendants were the adopted daughter of the deceased executrix, the surviving executrix (mother of
plaintiffs and the only resident of Richland County in the suit) and
a corporation some of whose stock was involved. The prayer was
for accounting, for construction of the will, and for an injunction
against disposal of assets.
The defendant demurred on the ground of improper joinder of
causes of action and was rebuffed by the lower court. The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that while the causes of action might be
united insofar as they arose out of the same transaction, the causes
27
of action required different places of trial.
Although an action to construe the will might have been brought
in Richland County, the action for accounting could not be, under
25. South Carolina Mental Health Commission v. Smith, 226 S.C. 175, 84

S.E. 2d 375 (1954).
26. 85 S.E. 2d 405 (S.C. 1955).
27. CODr. OF LAWS OF SOUTH

CAROLINA,
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Section 19-551 of the 1952 Code: "All proceedings in relation to
the settlement of the estate of any person deceased shall be had in
the probate court of the county in which his will was proved or the
administration of his estate was granted"; and under Section 15-445
of the 1952 Code: "When any probate court shall have first taken
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, such
court shall have jurisdiction of the disposition and settlement of all
the personal estate of such deceased person to the exclusion of all
other probate courts." These two sections were relied on in French
v.Way28 as requiring an action for an accounting against the representative of a deceased executor to be brought in the county of the
estate's administration, and not in the county of the defendant's residence. The court in the present case held French v. Way to be controlling, and applicable despite the fact that in that case the proceedings were in the Probate Court, since the Court of Common Pleas

had concurrent jurisdiction.2 9 The substance of the court's holding
is that "An action for an accounting against an executor or admini-

strator concerns the settlement of the estate and has to be brought
in the County in which the estate is being administered upon." 30

28. 93 S.C. 522, 76 S.E. 617 (1912).
29. French v. Way was followed in a Common Pleas action in Smith v. Heyward, 107 S.C. 542, 93 S.E. 195 (1917).
30. Although all parties and the court apparently treat the accounting as involving the settlement of the estate, it is possible to regard the functions of
the executrices, after paying debts and dividing the fund between themselves
for purposes of investment, as not executorial, but as purely trust functions. In other words, they might after a point be regarded as trustees rather
than as executors. The use of the terms "trustees" and "executors" is not
controlling as to their capacities: the test is as to the duties imposed; and of
course the same persons may occupy both offices separately and distinctly. As
to executorial and trust functions, see Desaussure v. Lyon, 9 S.C. 492 (1877) ;
Mordecai v. Schirmer, 38 S.C. 294, 16 S.E. 889 (1892). Treating the executrices as trustees after the division of the funds between them, subsequent proceedings involving their conduct would not be proceedings involving the settlement of a testate or intestate estate. The residence of the defendant would
control. See Cone v. Cone, 61 S.C. 512, 39 S.E. 748 (1901). On the death
of the executrix-trustee title to the fund would pass neither in whole nor in part
to the deceased's husband, her executor, but to the surviving executrix-trustee,
who would be the proper person to sue the deceased trustee's representative
for an accounting. Andrews v. U. S. F. & G., 154 S.C. 456, 153 S.E. 745
(1929) ; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 200. On the failure of the trustee to act or
sue, the beneficiaries may sue in equity, joining the delinquent trustee and the
person against whom the claim is made. Fogg v. Middleton, 2 Hill Equity 591
(S.C. 1837) ; Bailes v. Southern Ry. Co., 87 S.E. 2d 481 (S.C. 1955). In their
complaint the plaintiffs alleged that the surviving executrix had failed to protect the interests of the plaintiffs; in their brief they state that the case does
not involve a trust estate. Quaere: If the estate is a trust estate and the
trustee refuses to sue, and the beneficiaries sue the recreant trustee, who resides in one county, and the person liable to the estate, who resides in another
county, what should be the venue?
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Survival of Actions-Filing of Claims-

Parties

The case of Dubuque Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Wilson,3 1 tried
in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, and originating in the Eastern
District of South Carolina, presents several interesting and important features in the subject under survey.
The action was brought by the insurance company to recover damages because of loss suffered by the company through issuance by a
local agent and a general agent of policies in violation of its instructions against writing such insurance. The company had been held
liable to the insured in state court litigation which culminated in an
unsuccessful appeal.8 2 The two agents involved had died before the
inception of this action and administration had been had on their
estates, and this action was brought against the beneficiaries of the
estates. The District Judge dismissed the complaint on the grounds
(1) that the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court disposed
of the issues raised by this case; (2) that the action was in tort and
did not survive; and (3) that the claim had not been asserted against
the estates of the deceased agents.
The Circuit Court reversed all three of the holdings. As to the
first, it was held that while the state court action adjudicated the liability of the insurance company, it did not pass upon the liability of
the agents to the company.
The defense that the action lay only in tort was held to be untenable. Although according to the court the facts justified an action
in tort, the essence of the plaintiff's cause of action was the violation
33
of a contractual obligation, and the contract right survived.
The third defense which the Circuit Court likewise held untenable
raises a more serious and debatable question and the court's position
on this score deserves repeating in full:
The contention of the defendant that the insurance company
lost the right of recovery because it failed to assert claims against
the estates of Carl A. Wilson and William R. Timmons is not
supported by the decisions of the South Carolina Courts. We
had occasion to examine this question in Muckenfuss v. Mar31. 213 Fed. 2d 115 (1954).

32. Dubuque Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Miller, 219 S.C. 17, 64 S.E. 2d
8 (1951).
33. The common law rule that tort causes of action die with the person has
not been entirely abrogated in South Carolina by the Survival Act. CODS OF
LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-269. Only torts involving injuries to the
person or property are saved by the statute from the operation of the common
law rule. Page v. Lewis, 203 S.C. 190, 23 S.E. 2d 1569 (1943). As a tort
the cause of action here, not involving injury to person or property, would not
be spared by the statute.
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chant, 4 Cir., 105 F. 2d 469, and reached the conclusion that in
South Carolina the primary source to which a creditor of an
estate must look for payment is the personal estate of the deceased in the hands of his personal representative; but that after
the distribution of the estate a creditor who has failed to file
his claim may collect from the heirs or distributees of the estate
to the extent that they have received assets therefrom. The
statutes requiring the representatives of an estate to give notice to
creditors are designed for the personal protection of executors
and administrators, and do not bar a creditor who fails to comply with the statute from enforcing his claim against the persons into whose possession the assets of the estate have come.
See McNair v. Howle, 123 S.C. 252, 264, 269, 116 S.E. 279;
Columbia Theological Seminary v. Arnette, 162 S.C. 272, 278,
168 S.E. 465; S. C. Code 1952 §§ 19-473 to 19-475 and notes.
There is a fatal weakness in this position supported as it may
seem to be by the authorities cited. All the cases relied on, including the Muckenfuss case, were decided prior to 1943, when Section
19-47434 was enacted; and undeniably in their construction of the
statutes then in force (Sections 19-473 and 19475) and relying on
earlier cases they were correct. The two sections on which these
cases are based go -back to 1789 and had received interpretation many
times.35 In short, these two statutes were not and are not nonclaim
statutes.3 6 But the 1943 Act (Section 19-474) clearly is such a
statute; and if it is not to be given such a construction, it is meaningless and purposeless. There is no conflict between the statutes: the
representative is still protected if he makes a distribution in ignorance
34. 43 STAT. 260. § 19-474 reads: "All claims of creditors of such estate
shall upon the expiration of eleven months after the first publication of the
notice prescribed in § 19-473 be forever barred unless before the expiration of
such period an account thereof, duly attested, shall have been filed with such
executor or administrator or with the judge of probate of the county in which
such estate is being administered. But the provisions of this section shall not
apply to obligations secured by mortgages or other liens which have been
duly recorded prior to the expiration of such period."
35. Ford v. Rouse, Rice 219, 222 (S.C. 1839): "The object of this provision in relation to notice to creditors is to protect an executor or administrator from a personal liability for a debt not rendered in. If there still remain
an abundance of assets in the hands of the executor or administrator, it would
be no objection to the plaintiff's recovery to say 'you had the legal notice but
failed to give me a statement of your debt;' for the executor or administrator
would not be called on to make the same good." Knotts v. Butler, 10 Richardson Equity 143, 145 (S.C. 1858): "The notice to creditors required by our
Act of 1789 is intended for the protection of an administrator who proceeds
to make regular distribution of the estate in ignorance of some dormant debts
of his estate .... "
36. See Columbia Theological Seminary v. Arnette, 168 S.C. 262, 278, 168
S.E. 465 (1932).
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of claims, but the claim to be an enforceable one against assets must
be filed within the stated eleven-months period. To the extent that
the cases ante 1943 deal with the immunity of the representative in
not paying claims of which he has no notice they are still law; to
the extent that they declare non-assertion of the claims within a given
time immaterial, they no longer have validity.
One may speculate upon the reasons for the court's failure to acknowledge the plain provisions of Section 19-474. The change of
decision-law by statute is no new phenomenon. What may be responsible, in part, is an editorial slip-up in the 1952 Code. The two
earlier sections appeared in the 1942 Code as Sections 8993 and 8994.
The Act of 1943 was inserted as an amendment to Section 8993. In
the 1952 Code under Section 19-474 there follows the usual list of
statutory and code antecedents, and the list contains the same references as the old Section 8993, plus a reference to the 1943 enactment. The list is, of course, inaccurate except for the 1943 reference and could easily have misled the court into the assumption that
the section had received construction under the earlier cases. In
the excerpt hereinabove quoted from the case there is reference to
"S. C. Code 1952 §§ 19-473 to 19-475 and notes". There are profuse notes under Sections 19-473 and 19-475; and under Section 19474 there appears this note: "This section is designed for the personal protection of the executor and does not bar a creditor who fails,
to comply with the statute from enforcing his claim against the distributees of the estate. Muckenfuss v. Marchant, 105 F. 2d 469,
(1939)." Obviously the note is in error, since a 1939 decision cannot construe a 1943 Act, but it may have played a part in misleading
the court.
Since the decision is in a federal appellate case not involving a
federal question, but construing state law, it of course is lacking
in binding authority; and it can hardly be persuasive in the light of
its patent error.
If the statute is, as has been demonstrated, a nonclaim statute, the
further question nevertheless would arise whether the statute applies
to claims of the kind in suit. The scope of the statute in terms of
the kinds of claims affected by it has not as yet been determined.
Both of the agents involved in the present suit were dead before the
adjudication by the South Carolina Supreme Court of the insurance
company's liability. One had died before the beginning af the litigation; the other died shortly after it had begun; and the Supreme
Court's decision was handed down long after the commencement of
administration of the respective estates. The contractual breach by
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the agents occurred when the instructions to the agents were violated;
the liability in the sense of the responsibility to answer for the damages caused was established, or the groundwork laid for it, after the
period of the statute. Could the claim be regarded as a contingent
liability as to which, perhaps, the statute might not be operative?
A third feature is of minor concern -the necessity of joinder of
the personal representative with the beneficiaries. Such a joinder ordinarily is not only proper but necessary. 7 Two of the beneficiaries
defendants, were also the representatives of their respective estates. The Court stated that in view of the remand of the case for
further proceedings they could be brought in as defendants in their
representative capacity by amendment to the complaint.
LEGISLATION

Descent and Distribution
The Statute of Descent and Distribution 8 was amended by Act approved April 29, 195538a by the addition of the following subsection:
(10) If any person shall die without leaving any spouse,
child or other lineal descendant, father, mother, brother or sister
of the whole blood, or their children, brother or sister of the
half blood, lineal ancestor or next of kin but shall leave surviving a stepchild or stepchildren then such stepchild or stepchildren
shall inherit from the decedent the whole of the real and personal estate as tenants in common.
The amendment is designed to prevent an escheat where the intestate is not survived by a spouse or blood kin but does leave a stepchild or stepchildren. In thus providing for stepchildren, a nonconsanguineous relationship, the statute is virtually unique.
The apparent simplicity of the amendment may be marred by some
rather troublesome possibilities. One involves a possible omission in
drafting. The term "next of kin" as used in the unamended statute
has a special meaning, and appears first in sub-section 6 of Section
19-52. "Next of kin" as thus employed embraces blood kin after
other kindred are specially provided for. Among those provided
for ahead of "next of kin" are uncles and aunts and children of predeceased uncles and aunts; and the same sub-section 6 provides: "If
there be no uncle, aunt or child of a deceased uncle or aunt then the
37. McNair v. Howle, 123 S.C. 252, 116 S.E. 279 (1922); Columbia Theological Seminary v. Arnette, note 36, supra.
38. CODE or LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 19-52.
38a. S. C. AcTs AND JOINT RisoLuoxs 1955, No. 214, p. 309.
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estate shall descend to the next of kin." The added sub-section (10)
makes no reference to uncles, aunts and their children, and the term
"next of kin" as used there is presumably intended to embrace them,
and would probably be so construed. In a contest between an uncle
and a stepchild, the latter might plausibly and troublesomely argue
that he was preferred because of the failure to mention uncles, aunts
and their children in the amendment and that "next of kin" would
have to be given the same exclusionary and restricted meaning in
the amendment as in the statute itself. The possibilities arising out
of the omission can of course be obviated by supplying by amendment
the terms left out.
A second possibility of difficulty is more fundamental. It is not a
question of the wisdom of the legislation, since the legislature has the
last and only word on that. The situation which the legislation obviously envisions is that of a widow with young children who marries
again. She dies and later the husband, who has neither adopted the
children nor provided for them by will, dies intestate without blood
kin. Of course, if an old man marries an elderly woman who has
grown children and there is the same sequence of events these grown
stepchildren will also be provided for. Still, it may be better, in order that the deserving may benefit, that the non-deserving shall benefit also. The fundamental problem that arises is: when, if ever, does
a stepchild cease to be a stepchild? The related question is, was it
the intention of the legislature to provide for every possible stepchild?
The complexity of the question arises in the consideration of the
fact that the stepchild relationship is one of affinity, just as much as
the in-law relationship, and may not survive the dissolution by death
or divorce of the marriage,3 9 a matter apparently not passed on as
yet in this State.4 0 Does a stepchild cease to be a stepchild when the
natural parent dies or is divorced? Some questions stemming from
this problem are posed by these supposititious cases:
39. See 26 Am. Jur. 631; 1912B Ann. Cas. 1028; 2 C.J. 377.
40. In one respect State law seems to assume that the dissolution of marriage does not alter the condition of affinity. Under CoE op LAWS OF SOUTH
CAROLINA, 1952 § 20-1, among marriages forbidden is that of a man and his
stepmother. If his father were living and undivorced, the marriage to the
stepmother could not take place; hence it must refer to marriage after the
father's death or divorce from the stepmother. Similarly, under the same
section no woman shall marry her husband's son - obviously the reference is
to marriage after the death or divorce of the husband. See Tyson v. Weather-

ly, 214 S.C. 336, 52 S.E. 2d 410 (1949).

The question of whether the relation of affinity is terminated by the dissolution of the marriage that created it may arise in connection with matters of
incest (Section 16-402), disqualification of jurors and judges by reason of relationship within prohibited degrees of relationship by consanguinity and affinity, rights of beneficiaries under policies of insurance, and so on. As to insurance, see 99 A.L.R. 593.
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1. A, a bachelor, marries B, a widow with children X and Y. X
and Y become, of course, A's stepchildren. B dies. Are they then
A's stepchildren? The amendment apparently assumes that they are.
2. A, a bachelor, marries B, a divorcee with children X and Y. The
children remain with their father, the ex-husband of B. B dies. A
dies without blood kin. Do X and Y take?
3. A, a bachelor, marries B, a widow with children X and Y. A
and B are thereafter divorced. A dies without blood kin. Do X and
Y take?
4. A, a bachelor, marries B, a widow with children X and Y. A
and B are later divorced. Thereafter A marries C, a widow with
children R and S. Later A and C are divorced. A dies without blood
kin. Do X, Y, R and S take, or do only R and S, or none of them?
There are variations of the above questions, but the questions and
the variations all point up the nagging issues that the amendment may
raise. The amendment may create more problems than it solves.
Non-resident Executors and Administrators
By Act approved May 11, 1955, 4 1 § 10-433 and 19-591, relating to
the appointment of agents for service upon non-resident executors
and administrators, were amended in ways designed to clarify the
original statutes. The amendment to Section 10-433 inserts code
references omitted from the section. The amendment to Section
19-591 provides for service upon the Judge of Probate or Clerk of
Court when the agent appointed at the outset dies, removes from the
State, resigns, or for any reason cannot be served. Although the
original act mentions these contingencies, it stopped short of furnishing the substitute agent.
Filing of Wills
A new section to be known as Section 19-264.1 was adopted by
Act approved April 14, 1955:42
Section 19-264.1. When any last will or testament is filed
with the Probate Court having jurisdiction a certified copy of
same shall likewise be filed with the Judge of Probate of every
county of the state where the deceased owned real estate. Provided, that the legal representative of the estate shall not be
discharged until showing is made to the satisfaction of the Court
that the provisions of this section have been complied with.
41. S. C. AcTs
42. S. C.

AcTs

1955, No. 236, p. 456.
AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS 1955, No. 143, p. 191.
AND JOINT REsoLuTIONs
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